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Abstract—This paper explores the feasibility of social co-
operation between prosumers within an energy network in
establishing their sustainable participation in peer-to-peer (P2P)
energy trading. In particular, a canonical coalition game (CCG)
is utilized to propose a P2P energy trading scheme, in which a
set of participating prosumers form a coalition group to trade
their energy, if there is any, with one another. By exploring the
concept of the core of the designed CCG framework, the mid-
market rate is utilized as a pricing mechanism of the proposed
P2P trading to confirm the stability of the coalition as well
as to guarantee the benefit to the prosumers for forming the
social coalition. The paper further introduces the motivational
psychology models that are relevant to the proposed P2P scheme
and it is shown that the outcomes of proposed P2P energy
trading scheme satisfy the discussed models. Consequently, it
is proven that the proposed scheme is consumer-centric that has
the potential to corroborate sustainable prosumers participation
in P2P energy trading. Finally, some numerical examples are
provided to demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed
scheme.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer trading, social cooperation, coali-
tion game, consumer-centric, motivational psychology.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global market of rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) panels,
which was US$30 billion in 2016, is expected to grow by 11%
over the next six years. This shift towards solar will further
be complemented by an additional increase in residential
energy storage systems whose ability to deliver is expected
to grow from 95 MW in 2016 to 3700 MW by 2025 [1].
Such additional energy resources at the edge of the grid are
expected to be utilized not only to manage the energy demand
more efficiently but also to enable a significant mix of clean
renewable energy into the grid [1]. However, to make this
happen in reality, it is of utmost importance to incorporate the
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people who own these generating assets in their homes, that
is, the prosumers [2], into the energy market [1].
The important role of prosumers in the deregulated en-
ergy market is well recognized. For example, the world has
already seen the participation of prosumers in the energy
market through the feed-in-tariff (FiT) scheme [3]. In FiT,
the prosumers with roof-top solar panels can sell their excess
solar energy to the grid and can buy energy from the grid in
case of any energy deficiency. Unfortunately, the benefit to
the prosumers for participating in FiT is not significant [4],
which has influenced the recent discontinuation of some of
the FiT schemes, e.g., in Australia [5]. Further, net metering
is also used to enable bi-directional trading of energy between
prosumers and the grid. However, increased penetration of
non-dispatchable solar energy into the grid can potentially
compromise the grid’s stability. As a consequence, local gov-
ernments in many countries have imposed solar export limits
on the prosumer.
Given this context, an alternative approach to engaging
prosumers in the energy trading market, a proposal on the
application of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) trading mechanism in the
energy domain is introduced in [6], which can potentially
eliminate the limitations of the FiT scheme, and thus contribute
towards substantially increasing the percentage of renewable
energy penetration into the current electricity grid. Moreover,
the P2P trading mechanism not only benefits prosumers eco-
nomically but also helps the grid to maintain its stability by
enabling prosumers to inject to the grid via net metering within
the government imposed export threshold. Thus, considering
the potential of this P2P trading, a considerable number of
pilot projects are being implemented in the USA, Europe,
and Australia [7]. Nevertheless, the key question that needs
to be answered for the successful establishment of a P2P
energy trading platform is: how to prepare the P2P trading
as a consumer-centric1 scheme that will ensure sustainable
participation of prosumers in the P2P energy trading market.
Seeking a suitable answer to this question is particularly
important due to the following two characteristics of a P2P
energy trading market:
• In P2P trading, the main objective is to encourage the
participating prosumers to trade energy with one another
with a very low (or, not at all) direct influence from the
central controller (for example, the retailer). However,
1The consumer-centric property of a technology, for example, P2P energy
trading, properly incentivizes consumers to actively participate in the trading
process [8].
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2relaxing the influence of the central control body makes
the P2P a trustless system [9]. Hence, it would be a
challenging task to encourage the prosumers to cooperate
to trade energy with one another in such a system.
• In recent P2P pilot projects such as the Brooklyn mi-
crogrid, it is identified that when the prosumers socially
interact with one another to exchange their generated
solar energy, the trading price per unit of energy may
increase substantially [10]. This may potentially limit the
involvement of rational energy users who participate as
buyers in the energy market.
Given this context, this paper investigates how sustainable
users’ participation in P2P energy trading can be established
through social cooperation between the prosumers. In particu-
lar, we are interested in designing a P2P energy trading tech-
nique that encourages the prosumers to participate via forming
a coalition group among themselves despite the trustless nature
of the system. The trading scheme also needs to be beneficial
for the prosumers every time they participate irrespective of
their roles, that is, whether they are participating as the buyers
or as the sellers. In other words, the trading scheme needs
to satisfy the consumer-centric property, where the prosumers
would always find it beneficial to participate [11].
To this end, we have made following contributions in this
paper: 1) We propose a P2P trading technique through utilizing
the social cooperation between different prosumers within
an energy system by designing a Canonical Coalition Game
(CCG). By setting the rules of a social coalition with the
developed CCG, we show that it is always beneficial to the
prosumers of the system, for the considered value function and
assumption of this study, to cooperate with one another for
trading energy among themselves; 2) By exploring the idea
of the core, it is proven that there always exists a revenue
distribution that lies within the core, i.e., the core is non-empty.
We use a mid-market rate pricing scheme for distributing
revenues within the participating prosumers, and show that the
revenue that each prosumer receives for forming the coalition
lies within the core of the game, and thus ensures stable social
cooperation; 3) We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is
a consumer-centric technique that has the capacity to enable
significant user participation in energy trading. To do so,
we first introduce two behavioral models from motivational
psychology which underline the characteristics that have the
capability to motivate prosumers to always participate in
energy trading. Then, we show that our proposed scheme
satisfies both models, and therefore can be considered as a
consumer-centric trading scheme; 4) Finally, we validate the
properties of the proposed scheme, that is, stability and the
consumer-centric property, through real data based numerical
simulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide a survey of existing studies on P2P
energy trading. The system model of the proposed work is
explained in Section III followed by the proposed CCG in
Section IV. In Section V, we study the properties of the
proposed CCG inspired P2P trading scheme. Some numerical
case studies are demonstrated in Section VI, and finally, we
draw some concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART
Recently, there has been a considerable amount of research
effort to understand the potential of P2P trading in the energy
sector. The research focus of existing literature can be broadly
divided into three general domains: electric vehicles domain,
microgrids domain, and distribution networks domain.
A. Electric vehicles domain
In this domain, the main discussion is on the exchange of
energy between two sets of electric vehicles, that is, buyer set
and seller set, in order to achieve an economically beneficial
energy trading platform for all involved electric vehicles in the
trading process. Examples of such schemes can be found in
[12] and [13]. In [12], the authors target reducing the impact
of the electric vehicle charging process on the power system
during business hours. To do so, they exploit an activity-
based model to predict the activity of drivers during business
hours and then utilize that information to determine an optimal
P2P trading price per area and time slot to enable vehicles
with excess energy to share their battery energy with vehicles
in need of energy during business hours. Using Consortium
Blockchain, the authors in [13] propose a secure localized
P2P energy trading model for hybrid electric vehicles via
a double auction mechanism. It is shown that the proposed
trading method can achieve social welfare, improve transaction
security, and protect the privacy of the vehicle owners.
B. Microgrids domain
In the microgrid domain, existing literature on P2P trading
focuses on three different trading paradigms: 1) energy trading
between different microgrids, 2) energy trading between play-
ers within a microgrid, and 3) energy trading between peers
and microgrid.
1) Trading between different microgrids: Coordinated en-
ergy management with networked microgrids has been widely
discussed in the literature, for example, [14]–[17]. In [14], a
cooperative power dispatching algorithm of interactions among
microgrids is proposed for power sharing within the grid.
To handle the mismatch between the supply and demand of
energy in microgrids, a P2P energy sharing among microgrids
is proposed in [15] for improving the utilization of distributed
energy resources and saving electricity bills for all participat-
ing microgrids. In [16], the authors introduce the concept of
a nested transactive grid to model the distribution grid as a
nested set of virtual microgrids, where each microgrid can act
as a market. This facilitates P2P trading while incorporating
the security of the grid. Finally, a reinforcement learning based
energy trading game among smart microgrids is implemented
in [17] that enables each microgrid to individually and ran-
domly choose a strategy to trade the energy in an independent
market.
2) Trading between peers within a microgrid: There has
also been an increasing interest in modeling P2P trading
between prosumers within a microgrid in recent times. For
example, with a target to mitigate the intermittency of re-
newable generation within microgrids, a concept of distributed
3generation combined with cooperation by exchanging energy
among distributed resources is proposed in [18]. It is shown
that in the presence of limited storage devices, the grid
can benefit greatly from cooperation, which is reduced in
the presence of large storage capacity. In [19], the authors
propose a P2P energy sharing model with price-based demand
response, which is shown to be effective in reducing prosumer
costs and improving the sharing of photovoltaic energy. Other
examples of energy trading between peers within a microgrid
can be found in [20]–[25].
3) Trading between peers and microgrid: An interesting
concept of peer-to-microgrid exchange of energy is proposed
in [26] with the purpose of long-term planning for connected
industrial microgrids. Essentially, the authors propose a new
system of daily operation including industrial Load Manage-
ment and allowing peer-to-microgrid as well as external energy
exchanges. The developed tool is tested on a virtual industrial
microgrid set up to present the technical and economic outputs.
C. Distribution networks domain
In this domain, the focus of the studies is to address
new challenges for distribution grid operators since they face
electricity feed-in at low voltage levels not foreseen when
the grid layout was planned [27]. In this context, the authors
in [28] propose a dual-decomposition-based P2P algorithm
to control voltage for the distribution network by actively
managing the active and reactive power of DERs. An agent-
based distributed power flow solver is studied in [29] to deal
with problems from a completely distributed perspective. The
study presented in [25] focuses on the variation of power
losses due to the superposition of P2P energy transactions
in a microgrid. In particular, the authors propose using a
blockchain for handling energy loss allocation and define a
new timing for transacting intended P2P energy exchanges.
Other examples of studies in this domain can be found in [30]
and [31].
As evident from the above discussion, the surveyed studies
have made significant contributions to the field of P2P trading.
However, most of the discussed trading schemes have not
emphasized the users’ point of view on the adoption of such
techniques. Note that consumer-centric design is important
for the sustainable use of the techniques in the long run as
pointed out by [11], [8] and [32]. Therefore, in this work, we
seek to complement the existing work by demonstrating how
social cooperation between prosumers can lead to a consumer-
centric energy trading mechanism by making the contributions
discussed in Section I. To this end, we begin by developing a
suitable system model in the next section to use in the rest of
the paper.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Let us assume a smart energy system consisting of a
centralized power station (CPS) and N prosumers, where
N = |N |. Each prosumer n ∈ N can be considered as
a small user of energy in such a house, which is equipped
with a rooftop solar panel without any storage facility2 and
2An example of such a system is the grid-tie solar system without a storage
device [33].
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Fig. 1: This figure demonstrates the set up of an energy system in
which the users can potentially form coalitions with one another to
participate in the proposed P2P energy trading scheme.
can produce energy that it can either use for its household
activities or trade with other energy entities within the energy
network. Each prosumer n ∈ N is also equipped with a smart
meter3, which is capable of determining how much energy the
rooftop solar panel of the prosumer is generating, how much
energy the prosumer is consuming, and how much energy the
prosumer is selling to and/or buying from the CPS or any other
entities, when necessary.
The energy network under consideration is divided into
two layers including a physical layer and a virtual layer.
In the physical layer, all prosumers are connected to the
energy network via a traditional distribution network (set
up and run by the independent system operator), through
which the physical exchange of energy takes place between
the prosumers and the CPS, as well as the energy exchange
between different prosumers within the distribution network.
Examples of studies of the physical layer include [34]–[37].
However, the focus of this study is the virtual layer.
The exchange of all information is conducted over the vir-
tual layer of the network. Studies related to this layer focus on
understanding the effect of economic factors on the customer’s
decision making process, for example, modeling customer
behavior [38], designing incentives and pricing schemes [33],
modeling interactions between buyers and sellers [39], and
designing a consumer-centric scheme [40]. The work pre-
sented in this paper is exclusively relevant to this layer with
the purpose of understanding the effects of economic factors,
that is, pricing and the subsequent utility to the prosumers, on
motivating extensive prosumer participation in energy trading.
A common example of the virtual layer is the blockchain
based layer [9]. Blockchain is being used by a number of
P2P energy trading projects that are capable of distinguishing
between energy transactions metered at the service entrance
of each user and normal transactions with the grid (the utility,
the supplier of electricity) or P2P transactions with other users,
3Here, a smart meter refers to a smart hybrid system consisting of a number
of necessary meters and devices as a single package to perform the relevant
tasks of P2P trading.
4in order to bill correspondingly. An overview of the proposed
system is shown in Fig. 1.
Let us consider that at any time during a day, each prosumer
n ∈ N , has an energy demand of En,d, and the energy
generated from its rooftop solar panel is En,pv. Now, due to
the fact that the energy generated from the solar panel is free
of charge, it is reasonable to assume that each prosumer n
preferably consumes energy from its own rooftop solar panel
to meet its own demand. Thus, the amount of energy consumed
by the prosumer n from its own generation can be expressed
as
En,c = min(En,d, En,pv). (1)
Now, depending on the values En,c, En,d and En,pv, a pro-
sumer can act either as a seller to sell its surplus energy En,sur
to or as a buyer to buy its deficit energy En,def from the CPS
or other energy entities within the network. Here,
En,sur = En,pv − En,c, and (2)
En,def = En,d − En,c. (3)
We assume that all sellers belong to the set Ns and all buyers
belong to the set Nb. Clearly, Ns∪Nb = N and Ns∩Nb = φ
at any particular time. Now, if the buying and selling prices
per unit of energy are pb and ps respectively, the cost Jn and
revenue Un to each prosumer n from such energy trading is
Jn = pbEn,def, ∀n ∈ Nb, and Un = psEn,sur, ∀n ∈ Ns, (4)
respectively. In the traditional energy market, such energy trad-
ing is usually conducted between the CPS and the prosumers.
That is, each prosumer n buys its energy En,def from the CPS
at a price pb,g per unit of energy, which is set by the CPS.
Similarly, a prosumer sells its surplus energy En,sur, if there is
any, to the CPS with a selling price ps,g defined by the CPS.
Unfortunately, in general ps,g << pb,g [4], and consequently
Jn >> Un. Therefore, the monetary benefit that a prosumer
obtains from its trading with the grid is very limited. As a
consequence, there is a recent push towards a change in the
operation style of the energy market, in which prosumers with
energy surplus may trade the energy with another prosumer
with energy deficiency via P2P energy trading within the same
and/or neighboring energy network [1].
Nonetheless, to make such P2P energy trading a reality and
to be a part of the energy market, it also needs to be consumer-
centric, and prosumers need to find it beneficial to accept, so as
to continuously participate in such trading. Otherwise, if P2P is
not beneficial, they may withdraw prosumers with independent
generation and storage capacity will have an incentive to go
off-grid bringing an inefficient outcome, both for prosumers
and the energy network [41]. As such, we study a coalition
game structure to show the potential of social cooperation
among prosumers to develop a consumer-centric P2P energy
trading framework in the next section.
IV. COALITION GAME FOR P2P TRADING SCHEME
A coalition game provides analytical tools to study the
behavior of rational players when they cooperate [42]. To
design the proposed P2P energy trading under a coalition game
framework, we consider the energy use of the entire energy
network in the P2P energy trading paradigm. Therefore, the
total amount of surplus energy that is available to all prosumers
∀n ∈ Ns, after meeting their own demand is∑
n∈Ns
En,sur =
Ns∑
n
En,pv −
Ns∑
n
En,c, (5)
where
∑Ns
n En,c = min
(∑Ns
n En,pv,
∑Ns
n En,d
)
. Similarly,
the total energy deficiency of the prosumers ∀n ∈ Nb within
the energy network is∑
n∈Nb
En,def =
Nb∑
n
En,d −
Nb∑
n
En,c. (6)
Indeed, the prosumers can sell their surplus energy to or
buy their deficient energy from the CPS. Alternatively, the
prosumers can also trade the energy among themselves via
P2P energy trading considering the limited economic benefit
from the energy trading with the CPS [4]. Nonetheless, the
establishment of such P2P trading is contingent on the benefit
that the prosumers may attain from the energy trading. For
instance, if the monetary benefit from such trading is not
attractive, and/or requires significant computational power, the
motivation for the prosumers to adopt such trading scheme
could be very low. Furthermore, for sustainable and consumer-
centric P2P trading, it is also important that benefit to the
prosumers is always better than the trading with the CPS every
time they participate in the P2P trading [43].
In this context, we propose a CCG structure in the following
section to demonstrate the benefits of forming a coalition
among the prosumers for participating in P2P energy trading.
Then, after discussing the properties of the game, we focus
on how the proposed CCG based P2P energy trading structure
establishes itself as a consumer-centric energy trading tech-
nique.
A. Game Formulation
A CCG is characterized by a set of players N = Ns ∪ Nb
that forms a coalition, and a value function ν that demonstrates
the worth of the coalition in terms of a numerical value. To
this end, the proposed coalition game can be formally defined
by its strategic form as
Γ = {N , ν}. (7)
Here, ν refers to the monetary amount that the participating
prosumers, as a coalition group, may earn or spend during
the P2P trading process. Hence, the proposed Γ is a coalition
game with transferrable utility, where the value function ν can
be expressed as:
ν(Ns ∪Nb) = ps,g max
(
0,
(∑
n∈Ns
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb
Em,def
))
−pb,g max
(
0,
( ∑
m∈Nb
Em,def −
∑
n∈Ns
En,sur
))
. (8)
5Clearly, from (8), when the energy surplus of the prosumers
in Ns is more than the total demand of prosumers in Nb, the
excess energy is sold to the grid (to reduce energy wastage),
and vice versa. In other words, all the prosumers in N
cooperate with one another to trade the surplus energy among
themselves as a first priority, and then interact with the grid,
if necessary, to sell or buy the total excess or deficient energy
respectively.
We note that there is no guarantee of forming a stable
grand coalition (a single coalition of all prosumers within the
network) in a CCG. The effectiveness of such a coalition is
only confirmed if it is always beneficial for the prosumers to
form a grand coalition, rather than acting noncooperatively or
forming disjoint coalitions [44]. To this end, it is important
that Γ fulfils a number of requirements [42] that are necessary
for the effective and sustainable operation of the proposed P2P
trading. These requirements are summarized as follows:
• Benefit of cooperation: Cooperation, that is, the formation
of the grand coalition, is never detrimental to any of the
involved prosumers. In other words, in a CCG no group
of prosumers can benefit by leaving the grand coalition,
that is, by acting non-cooperatively. This is associated
with the property of superadditivity of the value function
of the game.
Definition 1. Consider the CCG Γ = (N , ν) in (7),
where ν is the value function of the game. Now, two
disjoint subsets Na ⊆ N and Nb ⊆ N will only cooper-
ate together and form a grand coalition if ν satisfies the
property of superadditivity, and therefore the following
inequality holds:
ν(Na ∪Nb) ≥ ν(Na) + ν(Nb). (9)
• Stability of coalition: The benefit (or, revenue) of a
coalition needs to be distributed among the prosumers in
such a way that no individual or subgroup of prosumers
have any incentive to abandon the grand coalition for
further benefit. The set of feasible allocation of such
revenues is defined as the core [42].
Definition 2. Let e be the payoff vector of the revenues
that each prosumer of the CCG Γ obtains, and the
revenue of each prosumer n ∈ N is indicated as en where
en ∈ e. Then the core of the Γ is defined as [42]:
C = {e :
∑
n∈N
en = ν (N ) and
∑
n∈S
en ≥ ν(S),∀S ⊆ N}.
(10)
If C of the game is non-empty, there exists a feasible
allocation of revenues among the participating prosumers,
in which no group of prosumers has any incentive to leave
the coalition. Hence, a stable coalition is established.
Nonetheless, one way to understand whether Γ has a
non-empty core is through using the Bondareva-Shapley
theorem [45], which can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. According to the Bondareva-Shapley theo-
rem, the core C of a CCG Γ is non-empty, if and only if for
every function f(S), where ∀n ∈ N : ∑S∈Pn f(S) = 1,
and 0 ≤ f(S) ≤ 1, the following inequality holds:∑
S∈P\φ
f(S)ν(S) ≤ ν(N ). (11)
Here, P is the power set of N , and Pn ⊆ P that has n
as one of the elements in all subsets.
V. PROPERTIES OF THE CCG INSPIRED P2P TRADING
SCHEME
In this section, we investigate two particular properties of
the proposed scheme in order to seek answers to the following
two questions: 1) is the cooperation formed between different
prosumers for P2P trading stable? and 2) is the proposed P2P
energy trading consumer-centric?
A. Property of stability
To do so, first we examine the superadditivity property of
the value function ν of the the game.
Theorem 1. The value function ν of the proposed game Γ, as
described in (8), is superadditive.
Proof. To prove this theorem, first we assume that∑
n∈Ns En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb Em,sur = z. Therefore, from (8), the
value function can be expressed as
ν = ps,g max(0, z)− pb,g max(0,−z). (12)
We note that (12) is a concave function.
Second, we assume that the set Nb of buyers and the set Ns
of sellers can further be broken down into subsets Nb,1 and
Nb,2, and Ns,1 and Ns,2 respectively, where Nb,1∪Nb,2 = Nb,
Nb,1 ∩ Nb,2 = φ, Ns,1 ∪ Ns,2 = Ns,and Ns,1 ∩ Ns,2 = φ.
Then, due to the linearity of ν it is reasonable to write
1
2
ν
[ ∑
n∈Ns
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb
Em,def
]
=
ν
[ ∑
n∈Ns
En,sur
2
−
∑
m∈Nb
Em,def
2
]
= ν
[[ ∑
n∈Ns,1
En,sur
2
−
∑
m∈Nb,1
Em,def
2
]
+
[ ∑
n∈Ns,2
En,sur
2
−
∑
m∈Nb,2
Em,def
2
]]
. (13)
due to the linearity of the value function ν. Now, according to
[20], due to the concavity of ν, (13) can be expressed based
on Jensen’s inequality as
1
2
ν
[ ∑
n∈Ns
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb
Em,def
]
≥
1
2
ν
[ ∑
n∈Ns,1
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb,1
Em,def
]
+
1
2
ν
[ ∑
n∈Ns,2
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb,2
Em,def
]
. (14)
6From (14), clearly ν decreases as the number of disjoint
coalitions increases, and therefore the value function ν of the
proposed Γ is superadditive.
Therefore, forming a grand coalition is always beneficial
for all participating prosumers in Γ. Now, we investigate if
the grand coalition is stable, which is affected by the revenue
that each prosumer attains by participating in the CCG Γ. For
instance, if the trading price ptr ∈ {ps,tr, pb,tr} of the CCG is
very close to pb,s, the prosumers in Ns will be very satisfied.
However, the buyer of set Nb will not have any motivation to
stay in the coalition as the purchase price per unit of energy is
too close to the grid price. Similarly, if ptr ≈ ps,g , the sellers
of the game will not be encouraged to stay within the coalition.
As such, it is imperative that there exists a trading price ps,g ≤
ptr ≤ pb,g , which would produce a set of revenues that would
make the coalition stable. In this context, now we state and
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the grid’s current pricing scheme, where
pb,g > ps,g , the proposed CCG Γ possesses a non-empty core
when the trading price ptr of the P2P energy trading is within
the range ps,g ≤ ptr ≤ pb,g .
Proof. According to Definition 3, to show that the core C of
the game Γ is non-empty, it is sufficient to show that ν satisfies
(11). This can be proven by following the same procedure
explained in Theorem 2 in [20] (on page 1401).
1) Distribution of revenue: Now, according to Theorem 2,
it is clear that the value function ν of the proposed Γ has a
non-empty core, in which each participating prosumer n ∈ N
receives a revenue that makes the coalition stable. To attain
the revenue distribution, different techniques including shapley
value [20], nucleolus [46], and proportional fairness [47]
have been used in the literature. In this paper, however, we
propose to use the mid-market rate pricing [48] as a means
of distributing the revenue between the prosumers. The main
reasons behind using this technique are: 1) this is simple to
implement without any computational complexity, which is
important and expected for the practical deployment of P2P
trading scheme [49], 2) its suitability for energy trading has
been demonstrated by its deployment in a P2P energy trading
testbed in Europe [48], and 3) importantly, the pricing scheme
ensures that the core of the proposed value function is non-
empty, and therefore we achieve a stable coalition by using
this mid-market rate.
Mid-market rate: According to mid-market rate, the price
per unit of energy for energy trading is decided based on three
different cases [48]: 1) Generation is equal to demand, 2)
Generation is greater than demand, and 3) Generation is lower
than demand. Nevertheless, in all cases, the energy trading
between the participants takes place with the price ptr per
unit of energy, which is chosen to be the mid-value of the
buying and selling prices set by the grid for its trading with
the EUs.
ptr =
ps,g + pb,g
2
. (15)
Case 1 - Generation is equal to demand: In this case, the
net energy demand and production of all prosumers within the
network is zero. That is, the total surplus energy
∑
n∈Ns En,sur
of Ns sellers is sold to the buyers of set Nb. Hence, the selling
price ps,tr and buying price pb,tr of each participant in n ∈ Ns
and m ∈ Nb respectively are equal to one another and as same
as the expression in (15).
Case 2 - Generation is greater than demand: In this case,
the net energy production is non-zero, and therefore the sellers
can sell the total surplus energy to the grid at a price ps,g per
unit of energy after meeting the demand of prosumers with
energy deficiency of the network. Clearly, the buying price
pb,tr of each buyer is
pb,tr = ptr =
ps,g + pb,g
2
. (16)
The selling price ps,tr per unit of energy in this case, however,
depends on the total generation
∑
n∈Ns En,pv, total demand∑
n∈Nb En,d of prosumers with energy deficiency, and prices
ptr and ps,g . In particular, ps,tr can be expressed as
ps,tr =
∑
m∈Nb
Em,d × ptr +
 ∑
n∈Ns
En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb
Em,d
× ps,g∑
n∈Ns En,sur
.
(17)
In (17), the numerator refers to the total revenue that the sellers
of the network can earn by selling their surplus energy. The
first term
∑
m∈Nb
Em,d × ptr denotes the revenue by selling
energy to the buyers inNb at a price ptr per unit of energy, and(∑
n∈Ns En,sur −
∑
m∈Nb Em,d
)× ps,g is the revenue gained
from selling the rest of energy to the grid.
Case 3 - Generation is lower than demand: In this case, the
net energy demand within the network is non-zero. Therefore,
the buyers of Nb need to meet their excess energy demand∑
m∈Nb Em,d −
∑
n∈Ns En,sur from the grid. Indeed, as in
case 1 and 2, the selling price ps,tr that each seller n ∈ Ns
charges the buyers for selling their surplus energy is equal to
ps,tr = ptr =
ps,g+pb,g
2 . The buying price ps,tr per unit of
energy, on the other hand, will be affected by the available
total surplus
∑
n∈Ns En,sur, total demand
∑
m∈Nb Em,d and
the prices ptr and pb,g . That is
pb,tr =
∑
n∈Ns
En,sur × ptr +
 ∑
m∈Nb
Em,d −
∑
n∈Ns
En,sur
× pb,g∑
m∈Nb Em,d
.
(18)
Here,
∑
n∈Ns En,sur × ptr is the cost to the buyers for
buying energy from the prosumers with energy surplus, and(∑
m∈Nb Em,d −
∑
n∈Ns En,sur
)× pb,g is the cost of buying
the rest of the need from the grid.
Here, it is important to the note that, as the P2P trad-
ing is proposed, depending on the values of
∑
m∈Nb Em,d,∑
n∈Ns En,sur, pb,g and ps,g , the values of ps,tr and pb,tr are
fixed for each time slot irrespective of whether the prosumers
form a grand coalition or disjoint coalition. In other words,
once a prosumer decides to trade energy with other prosumers
instead of trading with the grid, it needs to buy and sell using
pb,tr and ps,tr respectively set for that time slot. Note that
we do not consider the regulatory charges within the pricing
7scheme. However, the P2P platform provider can charge the
prosumers a fee incorporated in the trading price [50] and then
pay the ISO a subscription fee for using its infrastructure for
P2P trading [51].
Theorem 3. For the considered mid-market rate pricing
schemes in Case-1, Case-2 and Case-3, the core of the
proposed CCG Γ is non-empty, and therefore the formation
of a stable grand coalition is confirmed.
Proof. To prove this theorem, first we note from Theorem 2
that a grand coalition for the proposed CCG Γ is always
stable for a pricing scheme, in which the trading price,
which includes both selling and buying prices ps,tr and pb,tr
respectively, satisfies the condition ps,g ≤ {ps,tr, pb,tr} ≤ pb,g .
Second, it is clear from the description of above three cases
that both trading prices in Case 1, the buying price pb,tr
in Case 2, and the selling price ps,tr in Case 3 satisfy the
above mentioned condition. Therefore, proving that both (17)
and (18) also satisfy the conditions ps,g ≤ ps,tr ≤ pb,g and
ps,g ≤ pb,tr ≤ pb,g respectively is sufficient to complete the
proof of Theorem 3.
As such, let us first assume that
∑
m∈Nb Em,d∑
n∈Ns En,sur
= k, where
k < 1 for Case 2 (as
∑
n∈Ns En,sur >
∑
m∈Nb Em,d), and
based on this assumption (17) can be written as
ps,tr = k×ptr+(1−k)×ps,g = (k×ptr+ps,g)−k×ps,g. (19)
Now, from (15), clearly ptr > ps,g as pb,g > ps,g . Hence,
from (19), we can confirm that ps,tr ≥ ps,g . Now, to prove that
ps,tr ≤ pb,g , first we consider that ps,tr > pb,g , and therefore,
from (19)
k × ptr + ps,g − k × ps,g > pb,g. (20)
Then, replacing ptr with
ps,g+pb,g
2 , and rearranging the terms,
(20) can be expressed as
ps,g − k
2
ps,g > pb,g − k
2
pb,g, (21)
which is not possible as pb,g > ps,g and k < 1. Hence, ps,tr ≤
pb,g . So, ps,tr in (17) satisfies the condition ps,g ≤ ps,tr ≤ pb,g .
Similarly, by assuming
∑
n∈Ns En,sur∑
m∈Nb Em,d
= k′ in (18), and
following the same procedures as described for ps,g in (17),
it can be proven that pb,tr in (18) also satisfies the condition
ps,g ≤ pb,tr ≤ pb,g , and thus Theorem 3 is proven.
Remark 1. An underlying assumption in the proposed scheme
is that only the grid and the designed trading platform that
provides the P2P trading services are in the considered
system. Hence, there is no other competitor that offers different
services for P2P trading. However, if more competitors exist,
the game needs to be designed in a different manner, which is
an interesting extension for future work. Nonetheless, if there
is no competitor, the grand coalition proposed in this study is
a stable coalition.
B. Consumer-Centric Property
As we mentioned in Section I, for the successful estab-
lishment of an energy trading scheme, it is critical that the
prosumers within the system are actively participating in the
trading. In this context, the purpose of this section is to
understand how people can be motivated to participate in
energy trading, and then investigate whether the proposed
energy trading scheme in this paper fulfills the requirements
of the motivational models, and thus can be considered as
consumer-centric.
To this end, first, we note that motivation is closely related
to the emotional process that initiates behavior [43]. It is a
branch of behavioural science that helps us to understand how
to mediate the psychological process that guides real behav-
ior [52], [53], and has been used in engineering [54], [55],
public health [56], education system [57], economics [58], and
medicine [59]. In motivational psychology, there are several
models that can be studied to show how users can be motivated
to adopt a certain behavior. Examples of such behavioural
models, which are also the subject of this section, include
the rational-economic model and the positive reinforcement
model.
Definition 4. The rational-economic model establishes that
people adopt pro-environmental behavior based on economi-
cally rational decisions [60]. In other words, monetary cost
is the key motivator for people to take necessary actions, e.g.,
participating in the P2P energy trading.
Definition 5. A positive reinforcement defines the case when
a human response to a situation is followed by a reinforcing
stimulus that increases the possibility of having the same
response from them when a similar situation occurs [61].
According to these definitions, a trading scheme that satis-
fies both rational-economic and positive reinforcement proper-
ties has very high possibility to be accepted by the customers
in the market, and hence would be a consumer-centric scheme.
Therefore, to confirm that the proposed trading scheme is
consumer-centric, it is sufficient to show that the proposed
scheme satisfies both the models.
Now, clearly, for the considered mid-market rate pricing
scheme, the proposed Γ based P2P energy trading scheme
satisfies the rational-economic model due to the following facts
• The value of coalition in (8) is defined in terms of mon-
etary revenue that the coalition attains from participating
in the proposed P2P energy trading.
• In Theorem 2, it is shown that the core of the proposed Γ
is non-empty. Therefore, there exists a revenue distribu-
tion vector for the participating prosumers such that none
of the prosumers would have any incentive to leave the
grand coalition.
• Finally, in Theorem 3, it is proven that the revenue
that each prosumer obtains by using the mid-market rate
pricing scheme in the proposed Γ lies within the core of
the game.
Therefore, all the participating prosumers in the proposed Γ
are always satisfied with the monetary revenues that they
receive by participating in the proposed P2P.
Theorem 4. The discussed P2P energy trading technique
based on the proposed Γ complies with the property of positive
reinforcement.
8Proof. According to Definition 5, the positive reinforcement
property confirms that a prosumer will get positive encour-
agement to do anything, for example, participating in the P2P
energy trading in this case, if he receives the similar positive
outcome every time he participates. Now, we note that at any
time of a day, depending on the demand and supply of energy
to the prosumers, the proposed CCG is conducted for any of
the three cases mentioned in Section V-A1. Now, it is proven
in Theorem 3 that for each of the three cases the revenue
distribution always lies within the core of the game. In other
words, regardless of the type of the case, the prosumers benefit
every time they participate in the proposed P2P energy trading.
Thus, the proposed P2P energy trading satisfies the positive
reinforcement model and the theorem is proven.
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the proposed P2P
energy trading scheme is a consumer-centric scheme.
VI. CASE STUDY
To show the effectiveness of social cooperation in the
proposed P2P energy trading scheme, in this section we
demonstrate some results from numerical case studies. In par-
ticular, we show that the proposed P2P energy trading scheme
1) ensures the formation of a stable coalition among the
participating prosumers, 2) brings benefits to the participants
in terms of reducing overall energy usage cost compared to
the non-participating prosumers, and 3) satisfies the consumer-
centric property. For the numerical study, we use publicly
available real-data on solar generation4 and household energy
demand of residential consumers5. We consider five residential
houses as prosumers, each of which is equipped with a 3kWp
solar panel. We use 15 minute resolution data to validate the
model, and the data used for this case study was recorded in
December 2013. The values of grid’s buying price (ps,g) and
FiT price (pb,g) are assumed to be 24.6 and 10 cents/kWh
respectively according to the electricity price in Brisbane,
Australia.
1) Formation of stable coalition: We note that the coalition
between the participating prosumers in the proposed CCG
is stable if the CCG possesses a non-empty core. From
Theorem 2, the condition of having a non-empty core is that
the trading prices including both the buying and selling prices
per unit of energy (i.e., pb,tr and ps,tr respectively) during
the P2P energy trading always need to be within the range
[ps,g, pb,g]. In this context, we show the trading price per unit
of energy for a single day (December 2, 2013) in Fig. 2. From
the figure, first we note that P2P trading only takes place from
8.00 am to 3.00 pm as that is the duration of time when the
sun was available to produce energy from the prosumers’ solar
panels. Consequently, for the rest of the day, prosumers need to
rely on the power from the CPS and do not cooperate with one
another. Second, during the P2P trading period, it is obvious
from Fig. 2 that the trading prices, which are developed based
on the mid-market rate in (15), (16), (17), and (18), are always
within the specified range between the grid’s selling price and
4Public solar data is collected from IEEE PES ISS website.
5Residential data is available in the website of National Energy Efficiency
Alliance (NEEA).
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Fig. 2: This figure demonstrates the buying and selling price per unit
of energy at different time slots of the day. The price during P2P
energy trading is only visible when solar energy is available.
TABLE I: This table demonstrates the total cost to different pro-
sumers .
Cost savings for one month period Cost savings on a single sunny day
Prosumer
Cost with 
P2P 
trading 
(Cents)
Cost with 
FiT trading 
(Cents)
Cost 
savings 
(Cents)
% cost 
savings
Cost with P2P 
trading (Cents)
Cost with 
FiT
trading 
(Cents)
Cost 
savings 
(Cents)
% cost 
savings
Prosumer 
1 20638 21443 805 3.76 333.43 512.21 178.78 34.91
Prosumer 
2 18816 19487 671 3.45 371.57 538.41 166.84 30.98
Prosumer 
3 81328 82784 1456 1.76 2079.5 2284.9 205.4 8.99
Prosumer 
4 67863 68717 854 1.24 1579.2 1770.1 190.9 10.79
Prosumer 
5 17518 18316 798 4.36 141.08 300.26 159.18 53.02
FiT price. Hence, every time the households participate in the
proposed P2P energy trading scheme, they form a stable grand
coalition for trading energy with one another to maximize their
benefits in terms of cost saving.
2) Cost saving to each prosumer: To demonstrate how the
proposed P2P trading may help each prosumer to reduce its
cost of energy usage, we show the total cost to each of the
five prosumers for a month (December 2013) in Table I. The
demonstrated costs include both the cost for adopting the
proposed P2P scheme as well as for using the traditional FiT
scheme. Now, based on the information illustrated in Table I,
the P2P scheme always outperforms the current FiT scheme in
terms of reducing the total cost to each prosumer. For example,
prosumer 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 can save around $8.05, $6.71, $14.56,
$8.54, and $7.98 or percentage savings of 3.76%, 3.45%,
1.76%, 1.24%, and 4.36% respectively. Based on this result,
we can summarize that percentage savings are different for
different users. A lower percentage can be translated into
relatively large monetary savings compared to other prosumers
with higher percentage savings. For instance, although pro-
sumer 3 and prosumer 5 have percentage savings of 1.76%
and 4.36% respectively, their actual total monetary savings in
the respective month are $14.56 and $8.50 respectively.
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Fig. 3: This figure demonstrates how the proposed CCG satisfies the
positive reinforcement property for the proposed pricing scheme.
Further, we note that the percentage savings for the P2P
scheme are not substantial compared to the FiT scheme as
shown in Table I, which is, in fact, a result of the lower
sunshine hours at different days of the month. For example, we
observe from the dataset that in multiple days of the month,
there was zero production of energy from the solar panels,
which subsequently increases the total cost to the prosumers
significantly (thus reducing the savings) across the whole
month. Nonetheless, the savings can significantly improve on
sunny days. For example, on December 2, 2013 (in the right-
hand side of the same table), the percentage cost saving to each
prosumer varied from as low as 9% to as high as 53%, which is
a substantial saving. The difference in cost savings is, however,
for the same reason mentioned previously. Nevertheless, it is
obvious from this result that the social cooperation between
the prosumers in the proposed CCG based P2P trading scheme
has the potential to bring benefit to the prosumers compared
to the case without any cooperation.
3) Attainment of consumer-centric property: Finally, we
show if the proposed P2P trading scheme demonstrates the
consumer-centric property. To this end, first, we note that
the rational-economic property of the proposed scheme is
already demonstrated in the previous section, in which we
show that the proposed scheme always brings economic benefit
to each prosumer. Hence, to confirm that the proposed scheme
possesses the consumer-centric property, it is sufficient to
show that the proposed scheme also satisfies the positive-
reinforcement property.
In this context, in Fig. 3, we show the benefit to five
prosumers in terms of cost savings compared to the FiT
scheme for each day of a month. As can be seen from the
figure, social cooperation always benefits the prosumers as
long as the day is not without sun. Of course, sunny days
(as demonstrated by the earlier days of the month) benefit the
prosumers more compared to days with relatively less sunshine
time (demonstrated by the later days of the month). However,
in the worst case when there is no sun in the sky, the cost
savings compared to FiT is zero, that is, the cost of social
cooperation is the same as the cost for participating in the
FiT scheme. Nonetheless, such events are not very frequent
as can be seen from the figure. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the benefit to the houses for participating in P2P via
social cooperation is consistent across each day the month
depending on the sunshine time each day and never detrimental
(never increases the cost to the prosumers compared to the
existing FiT). As a result, the overall cost savings across a
month is also noticeable. For instance, as shown in Fig. 3,
the total cost savings per month to prosumer 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 are $8.00, $6.70, $14.50, $8.50 and $8.00 respectively.
Hence, it is reasonable to establish that the proposed P2P
scheme always benefits the prosumers, and thus satisfies the
positive reinforcement model. Hence, the proposed scheme is
consumer-centric.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the feasibility of social
cooperation among prosumers in confirming sustainable users’
participation in P2P energy trading. To do so, a P2P energy
trading scheme inspired by a CCG has been proposed and its
different properties have been studied. It has been shown that
the game possesses a non-empty core, which confirms the sta-
bility of the grand coalition among the participating prosumers.
Further, a mid-market rate based pricing scheme has been
proposed and it has been demonstrated that the revenue that
each prosumer received for this mid-market rate lies within
the core. Furthermore, to confirm the sustainable participation
of the prosumers in the proposed P2P energy trading scheme,
we have introduced two models from motivational psychology,
and have shown that the proposed P2P scheme satisfies both
of them. Note that this consequently has proven the potential
of users’ acceptance of the proposed scheme. Finally, we have
provided numerical case studies to prove the claims that we
made in the paper.
A potential extension of this work would be to incorporate
network constraints such as voltage constraints, thermal con-
straints, and ramp rates into the designed model and identify
how this impacts user participation in the P2P trading. Another
future extension of the proposed work would be to investigate
how the behavior of the system is affected if an integrated
storage device with each of the prosumers’ solar systems is
considered. Further, another interesting future extension of
the proposed work is to determine how the stability of the
proposed coalition is affected when there are multiple P2P
energy trading platform providers in the network offering
different pricing schemes for trading.
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